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ABSTRACT 
 Every law enforcement agency uses records management systems (RMS) that 
contain a wealth of information essential for investigations or intelligence. This 
information includes crime reports, arrest reports, name records, and property records. 
The ability to share this information between law enforcement agencies, especially those 
with bordering jurisdictions, would appear beneficial to the homeland security enterprise; 
however, this thesis reveals that sharing RMS data is not occurring as often as expected. 
Direct RMS connections are uncommon, and law enforcement agencies possess valuable 
information hemmed off in seclusion. 
 This thesis examines a research-based RMS model and other systems that attempt 
to solve the data-sharing problem. One case study reveals the costly failure of a records 
system commissioned by the FBI. A survey and interviews of Texas police agencies 
reveal gaps in information sharing, including many not furnishing data to exchange 
networks. Although fusion centers and regional information-sharing systems (RISS) 
provide valuable intelligence and investigative products, many police agencies do not use 
these resources. 
 How can law enforcement improve information sharing? The answer requires 
agency leaders to become educated on the many resources available and break down 
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All law enforcement agencies use a records management system (RMS) to organize 
crime data and criminal case management. Over the last three decades, the technology 
behind computerized records has significantly advanced, and the capability to share 
information electronically has seen exponential growth. These innovations have resulted 
in a market opportunity for dozens of different vendors to create RMS solutions for law 
enforcement. The variety of RMS choices creates problems and opportunities. The problem 
is a lack of information sharing because most of these systems are not directly connected 
to each other. This disconnect means that investigators or analysts in adjacent jurisdictions 
may not directly see or share crime and offender information without subscribing to 
additional resources. This lack of sharing hampers law enforcement efforts to build a 
broader strategy to combat organized criminal or terrorist-related activities.  
Law enforcement can improve by examining the possibility that multiple agencies 
sharing jurisdictional boundaries could also share an RMS. An extension of this theory 
could be that regions or states adopt a shared RMS so that law enforcement officers are 
accessing and entering information on the same platform. A shared system means that users 
across jurisdictional boundaries have a standard operating platform and may be more likely 
to understand the context and content of data from other jurisdictions.  
Absent a shared RMS, other tools such as data exchanges and data warehouses exist 
in various forms throughout law enforcement. One of the more prominent exchanges is the 
National Data Exchange (N-DEx), which “provides criminal justice agencies with an 
online tool for sharing, searching, linking, and analyzing information across jurisdictional 
boundaries.”1 N-DEx is a useful investigative tool; however, N-DEx depends on agencies 
to share data from the RMS via an interface. If an agency chooses not to share data, the 
system loses the value that information could have added. Without proper training, 
investigators might know about or may not see the value in using N-DEx and other data 
                                                 
1 “National Data Exchange (N-DEx) System,” FBI Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS), 
accessed December 5, 2019, https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ndex. 
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exchanges or data warehouses for research or analysis. These limitations restrict the ability 
to make consistent investigative connections across jurisdictional boundaries. 
There are many different users of law enforcement RMS, including police officers, 
investigators, administrators, and analysts. External customers such as insurance 
companies, research universities, and civic organizations also have a stake in the RMS 
data. RMS contains numerous modules such as computer-aided dispatch, name records, 
property records, arrest reports, and crime reports, all of which serve essential functions 
within the organization. RMS serves a critical role in the law enforcement function, both 
for internal and external stakeholders. Some of the information that can protect our 
communities and our nation lies with the vast data gathered by local law enforcement 
agencies. 
Law enforcement agencies share and access information in a variety of different 
ways. The method or platform used is dependent upon the nature and origin of the data. 
Some of these include NCIC, fusion centers, data exchanges, data warehouses, and private 
industry data, and the array of choices may be one factor inhibiting the effectiveness of 
information sharing. Agencies are left to decide what resources they will subscribe to and, 
significantly, what resources to which they will contribute information. Law enforcement 
should develop a common strategy to determine how agencies will share information. One 
alternative could be an extensive, federated records management and sharing system 
operated by a government agency. 
A case study in this research examines the FBI’s Virtual Case File (VCF) as a 
comparative example of a large RMS and how planning errors resulted in substantial 
financial waste. The harsh lessons learned from the VCF fiasco and the FBI’s resultant 
change of strategy can be a guidepost for other law enforcement agencies in developing 
large, shared systems. Another case study looks at the Criminal Research Information 
Management Evaluation System (CRIMES), which Sam Houston State University 
maintains. CRIMES is an information management platform used by over 50 law 
xvii 
enforcement agencies in Texas.2 The case study examines the research motives behind the 
system and the ability for CRIMES to successfully provide an effective and connected 
RMS for smaller law enforcement agencies. 
The author surveyed 125 Texas police departments to examine the state’s broader 
RMS usage and information sharing among municipal police agencies. Only municipal 
police agencies in Texas were selected so that the research could be confined to 
organizations with similar functional responsibilities. The survey identified a wide variety 
of RMS vendors used among these agencies. The data also suggests that many police 
departments fail to use external resources for investigative or intelligence information. 
Perhaps the most startling information gained from this survey is that 80 percent of the 
police departments who responded reported that they did not directly share their RMS 
information with N-DEx, or other information exchanges. 
The author conducted personal interviews with RMS users from police departments 
to better understand actual and perceived problems with sharing criminal and intelligence 
information. Some interviews targeted current and recent CRIMES user agencies as part 
of the case study for that system, which is also only available to Texas law enforcement. 
CRIMES started as a tool to provide academic researchers in criminal justice direct access 
to crime data. It has evolved into an information management system that competes directly 
with the vendors in the private sector. Despite some of the limitations and problems, 
CRIMES provides a good RMS platform for small and medium-sized agencies that do not 
have a long list of unique requirements.  
Information from the interviews also revealed similar gaps in RMS information 
sharing as was gleaned from the surveys. CRIMES is currently not sharing information 
between agencies, although developers are exploring this possibility via a hosted solution. 
                                                 
2 Vincent Webb, The Criminal Research Information Management Evaluation System (CRIMES): A 
Comprehensive Records Management System for Smaller Police (Tempe, AZ: Arizona State University, 





Some agencies have discovered other RMS vendors who facilitate sharing across their 
platforms to include the ability to see data from other agencies using the same vendor. 
Records management and information systems are an essential part of the law 
enforcement organization. Most law enforcement officers agree that sharing this 
information between agencies is an essential component of information systems.3 The 
rapid progression of information technology makes it possible to communicate large 
amounts of information across the country in seconds. Information storage capabilities 
continue to grow, as do the opportunities for artificial intelligence to process data in ways 
only imagined 30 years ago. Why, then, is it so difficult to share this information on a 
widespread basis across law enforcement organizations in the United States or even with 
other countries?  
This thesis shows that political barriers, lack of governmental regulation, and 
marketing and training on information sharing resources are challenges to information 
sharing among law enforcement. Recommendations for improvements include regional 
agencies combining RMS, governmental sponsorship and funding, raising awareness of 
information resources, and mandatory participation in data exchanges.  
No single solution will fix the lack of information sharing in the homeland security 
enterprise. Law enforcement agencies collect a great deal of data that holds the potential to 
improve our country’s safety and security. The key is sharing, in particular outwardly. 
Front line workers need access to the information contained in both neighboring and distant 
law enforcement information systems to more effectively protect our nation from criminal 
or terrorist threats. 
Whether sharing a multi-agency RMS, participating in data exchanges, or an 
amalgamation thereof, law enforcement executives must find the right combination of 
solutions. These solutions should protect the data and the organization’s integrity while 
still providing external agencies the resources needed to connect criminal and intelligence 
                                                 
3 John Hollywood and Zev Winkelman, Improving Information-Sharing across Law Enforcement: 
Why Can’t We Know? (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249187.pdf. 
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information. A successful result will be a robust network that puts the United States on the 
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All law enforcement agencies use a records management system (RMS) to organize 
crime data and criminal case management. Over the last three decades, the technology 
behind computerized records has significantly advanced, and the capability to share 
information electronically has seen exponential growth. These innovations have resulted 
in a market opportunity for dozens of different vendors to create RMS solutions for law 
enforcement. The variety of RMS choices creates problems and opportunities. The problem 
is a lack of information sharing because most of these systems are not directly connected 
to each other. This disconnect means that investigators in adjacent jurisdictions may not 
directly see or share crime and offender information without subscribing to additional 
resources. Similarly, crime analysts are limited by geographical and jurisdictional 
boundaries in their data-gathering abilities. This lack of sharing hampers law enforcement 
efforts to build a broader strategy to combat organized criminal or terrorist-related 
activities.  
Investigators and analysts seek alternatives to bridge the information gap. 
Comprehensive solutions for managing law enforcement data have been in place for 
decades. The theory of entering and using shared criminal data has roots in the National 
Crime Information Center (NCIC), governed by the FBI. NCIC connects every subscribing 
agency to a network of data that can identify wanted or missing persons, stolen cars, or 
violent offenders, among other things.1 NCIC is an excellent tool for officers and 
investigators, but the scope of data is limited. These limitations likely carry over from the 
legacy system, which relied on old analog technology that could not transmit large volumes 
of data. With the advent of the internet age, these data restrictions may no longer apply.  
The opportunity exists to create better mechanisms and policies for sharing RMS 
data between law enforcement agencies. A shared RMS could solve many information-
sharing problems by consolidating data collection and accessibility into fewer systems. 
Federated search tools can make the information in one jurisdiction readily available to 
                                                 







other users on the same system. One model that tries to solve this problem and create a 
shared RMS is the Criminal Research Information Management Evaluation System 
(CRIMES), maintained by Sam Houston State University (SHSU). CRIMES caters to over 
50 law enforcement agency subscribers in Texas who use this platform for their RMS.2 In 
addition to the core RMS component, CRIMES has a full palette of business modules for 
law enforcement agencies’ various critical functions, including a computer-aided dispatch 
module, property and evidence management, and data analytics.3 Although initially a 
research tool for SHSU, CRIMES developed into a model for a multi-agency solution for 
organizations that do not desire to procure, build, or maintain an independent RMS. 
However, CRIMES also faces unique challenges that may hamper its ability to grow 
beyond small agency use. 
Absent a shared RMS, other tools such as data exchanges and data warehouses exist 
in various forms throughout law enforcement. Some are operated by governmental 
organizations, while others are private sector enterprises. One of the more prominent 
exchanges is the National Data Exchange (N-DEx), which “provides criminal justice 
agencies with an online tool for sharing, searching, linking, and analyzing information 
across jurisdictional boundaries.”4 N-DEx is a useful investigative tool; however, N-DEx 
depends on agencies to share data from the RMS via an interface. If an agency chooses not 
to share data, the system loses the value that information could have added. N-DEx is a 
separate system from NCIC and a local RMS, and agencies must navigate a degree of 
bureaucracy to access it. Without proper training, investigators might know about or may 
not see the value in using N-DEx and other data exchanges or data warehouses for research 
or analysis. These limitations restrict the ability to make consistent investigative 
connections across jurisdictional boundaries. 
                                                 
2 “Criminal Research, Information Management and Evaluation System (CRIMES),” Police Research 
Center, accessed December 8, 2019, http://www.cjcenter.org/prc/crimes/. 
3 Police Research Center. 
4 “National Data Exchange (N-DEx) System,” FBI Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS), 






Connecting information is vital for investigators in tracking criminals across 
jurisdictional boundaries. Terrorist activities are challenging to identify without excellent 
data sharing. Law enforcement can improve by examining the possibility that multiple 
agencies sharing jurisdictional boundaries could also share an RMS. An extension of this 
theory could be that regions or states adopt a shared RMS so that law enforcement officers 
are accessing and entering information on the same platform. A shared system means that 
users across jurisdictional boundaries have a standard operating platform and may be more 
likely to understand the context and content of data from other jurisdictions. This thesis 
explores how agencies share information, policy considerations, and the potential for 
improvement in the effectiveness and efficiency of using a shared RMS. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can law enforcement agencies directly share information more effectively and 
efficiently to identify criminal suspects, organized crime, or potential terrorist activities?  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis focuses on sharing law enforcement records between agencies. Many 
sources cover ways to share law enforcement records, including data exchanges, fusion 
centers, and data warehouses. The effectiveness and efficiency of fusion centers have been 
the topic of many discussions. Other publications provide minimum standards for RMS. 
This thesis seeks to explore effective models and instances of common-use systems. 
Multiple law enforcement agencies—specifically, agencies within the same state or those 
with overlapping jurisdictional boundaries—could use these systems. Information is scarce 
in this realm, although there are a few alternatives to explore. 
1. Linking Law Enforcement Data 
A prevailing theme in the literature about law enforcement records is linking 
together the data from a variety of different systems. The FBI provides information on 






nationwide and make it available to subscribers.5 Writers on the N-DEx system boast 
successes through anecdotal evidence, boldly stating that it “makes the world safer” 
without providing substantive data to support the claim.6 Several published articles about 
the success of N-DEx were written by one of its project managers, Kasey Wertheim. 
The Regional Information Sharing Systems Program (RISS) provides another 
resource for sharing law enforcement records. Information from RISS identifies a network 
of six centers that serve geographical regions of the United States and some foreign 
countries.7 Most literature on RISS support this system as a viable information-sharing 
resource. Law enforcement agencies are encouraged to join RISS; however, membership 
is not mandatory, and there are no legislated incentives for participation. 
2. Government Standards 
Publications from the FBI and the Department of Justice describe common 
standards for RMS.8 State agencies also set similar standards to guide law enforcement 
organizations when making purchases or building RMS.9 There is no discernable 
discussion on how the large variety of different RMS contributes to the lack of information 
                                                 
5 Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
6 Kasey E. Wertheim and Kelly Badgett, “The FBI’s National Data Exchange (N-DEx),” FBI Law 
Enforcement Bulletin, December 9, 2015, https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featured-articles/the-fbis-national-data-
exchange-n-dex. 
7 “About the RISS Program: A Proven Resource for Law Enforcement,” Regional Information Sharing 
Systems, accessed November 8, 2020, https://www.riss.net/about-us/. 
8 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Law Enforcement Records Management Systems (RMSs) as They 
Pertain to FBI Programs and Systems (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2010), https://ucr.fbi.gov/
law-enforcement-records-management-system. 
9 California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, Law Enforcement Records 









sharing. Instead, this literature type focuses on meeting records management standards and 
best practices, including recommending interfaces with legacy systems such as NCIC.10 
3. Fusion Centers 
Literary discussions on fusion centers debate the value, focus, and ethics of fusion 
center information. A Senate report from 2012 was very critical of fusion centers, 
identifying problems with spending accountability and questioning the value of the 
information provided, going so far as to say that fusion centers are “largely ineffective.”11 
Civil rights groups such as the ACLU are also critical of the fusion center concept, 
reporting that the centers collect information on law-abiding citizens and do not make 
significant contributions in fighting terrorism.12 There is much discussion about how 
fusion centers should operate, who the customer is, and whether these centers contribute to 
the United States’ overall security.  
On the other side of the fusion center debate are writers who find great value in 
their existence. Authors with experience in the field view fusion centers as central to the 
process of information sharing because they gather data from multiple sources and 
platforms.13 This supportive viewpoint tends to derive from persons with significant 
experience in the fusion center realm. 
                                                 
10 Law Enforcement Information Technology Standards Council, Standard Functional Specifications 
for Law Enforcement Records Management Systems (RMS) (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 
2006), https://it.ojp.gov/documents/LEITSC_Law_Enforcement_RMS_Systems.pdf. 
11 Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Federal Support for and Involvement in State 
and Local Fusion Centers: Majority and Minority Staff Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/10-3-
2012%20PSI%20STAFF%20REPORT%20re%20FUSION%20CENTERS.2.pdf. 
12 Michael German and Jay Stanley, What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers? (New York: American Civil 
Liberties Union, 2007), https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/privacy/fusioncenter_20071212.pdf. 
13 G. C. Sam McGhee, “The Wicked Problem of Information Sharing in Homeland Security—A 








4. Governance Issues 
Government-generated literature focuses on creating policies that encourage or 
require information sharing. Scholars cite a lack of cooperation in this area due to issues 
over the ownership of data.14 Smaller agencies may be fearful of the state or federal 
government having control over their systems. The argument for improving information 
sharing is valid and is supported in multiple sources. However, there is not a readily 
discernable discussion of the idea of using a shared RMS. The arguments in this area 
instead speak to why some different systems cannot share. This information is relevant to 
the thesis topic because governance issues are likely to be a barrier to using a common 
RMS in the same way they are currently a barrier to sharing other systems.15  
5. The Problem 
Law enforcement executives agree that developing a comprehensive RMS is a very 
challenging task and has many solutions. The sharing of law enforcement data is generally 
recognized as one key to improving homeland security. The federal government has 
sponsored various solutions to address this, such as RISS, the Law Enforcement Enterprise 
Portal (LEEP), and N-DEx.16 However, other writers report that some police data are 
hemmed off in seclusion due to proprietary vendor RMS.17 In addition to the CRIMES 
model in Texas, other researchers have explored the idea of a shared RMS for 
                                                 
14 John Hollywood and Zev Winkelman, Improving Information-Sharing across Law Enforcement: 
Why Can’t We Know? (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/grants/249187.pdf. 
15 Trevor Womack, “Economies of Scale: 9-1-1 Center Consolidation as a Means to Strengthen the 
Homeland Security Enterprise” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), 7, 
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/41458. 
16 “Law Enforcement Information Sharing,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, accessed 
June 30, 2020, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/who-we-are/organizations/ise/ise-archive/ise-additional-
resources/2142-law-enforcement-information-sharing. 
17 Andrew Dasher and Robert Haynes, “Overcoming Law Enforcement Data Obstacles,” Police Chief 








geographically connected law enforcement agencies.18 Detailed crime and criminal 
information are often isolated in otherwise geographically and jurisdictionally affiliated 
agencies. This siloing is part of the problem of information sharing that this thesis will 
address. 
6. Literature Conclusions 
Existing literature reveals both the advantages and the perils of large interconnected 
data systems. Legacy systems such as NCIC are good examples that show the viability of 
a sizeable common-user system. CRIMES appears to be a promising study in the area of 
shared RMS. RMS data is a specific niche of information collected by law enforcement 
officers. RMS may contain a treasure trove of information that can identify crime trends, 
information on specific criminals, and connections between specific crimes across artificial 
boundaries. A shared-use, common operating platform for RMS in law enforcement is one 
possibility to solve the problem of efficiently connecting information. More research is 
needed to identify better ways to collect and share RMS data. 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN   
1. Program Evaluation 
One of the research methods for this thesis is program evaluation using the 
formative method. The subject of the program evaluation is CRIMES RMS. This study 
identifies the strengths and weaknesses of CRIMES, not just as a software program but as 
a program of affiliated agencies using the system. The research identifies policies, 
practices, and functionality that either enables or hinders the end user’s ability to collect,  
share, or access RMS information from other agencies.  
2. Case Studies 
One case study looks at the FBI’s Virtual Case File (VCF) as a comparative 
example of a large RMS. The VCF study is a review of historical literature on the evolution 
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of the system. Another case study examines the strengths of CRIMES and where 
improvement is needed to successfully achieve the goal of providing a universal platform 
for RMS and other connected modules. The goal of these case studies is to create some 
recommendations on the advantages and pitfalls of a multi-agency RMS. 
3. Survey 
The author sent a survey link to over 642 Texas municipal law enforcement 
agencies. The survey asked questions to examine the state’s broader RMS and information 
sharing among municipal police agencies.19 Only municipal police agencies in Texas were 
selected so that the research could be confined to organizations with similar functional 
responsibilities. The survey identified the variety of RMS among these agencies and the 
resources agencies used to contribute to or access outside information. 
4. Personal Interviews 
The author conducted personal interviews with RMS users to better understand 
actual and perceived problems with sharing criminal and intelligence information.20 The 
interviewees were selected from Texas police agencies who responded to information 
requests from the author. The research focused on Texas agencies to narrow the scope and 
compare similarly situated agencies regarding their information requirements. Interviews 
targeted current and recent CRIMES agencies as part of the case study for that system, 
which is also only available to Texas law enforcement. The author used the same structured 
interview with a Utah department due to information gleaned from one Texas agency 
regarding a shared RMS in the Ogden area. All interview questions were designed to 
develop information regarding the use, inter-connectivity, and effectiveness of RMS and 
the agency’s use of other information-sharing resources. 
                                                 
19 A determination request was submitted to the Naval Postgraduate School’s Institutional Review 
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20 A determination request was submitted to the Naval Postgraduate School’s Institutional Review 
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D. CHAPTER REVIEW 
 Chapter II discusses law enforcement RMS users, functions, and challenges. 
Included is a breakdown of who the users are and the variety of information stored in an 
RMS. The chapter also explores why RMS is a valuable business enterprise and the 
challenges law enforcement executives face in procurement. 
Chapter III describes the multitude of ways that law enforcement agencies and 
officers share information. A summary of different systems outlines law enforcement’s 
complicated choices in finding the best system to obtain needed data. These systems are 
both linked and separated from other systems. The exact overlap is unclear, and the 
challenges of finding the right combination are abundant.  
 Chapter IV summarizes a pre and post 9/11 attempt by the FBI to create a 
nationwide records management system to consolidate sources and connect hundreds of 
FBI offices. This system came to be known as the Virtual Case File (VCF) and was also 
famous for abysmally failing as a project. This failure teaches lessons to help organizations 
build federated records management systems using an intentional and thoughtful planning 
process and project management methodology. 
 Chapter V is the methodology and data summary of research on Texas municipal 
police agencies. The research asks the agencies to identify what RMS they use and what 
other data sources they access for investigations and intelligence. The research reveals a 
snapshot of the variety of RMS among these types of agencies. The data also identifies 
whether agencies share the system with other law enforcement organizations or data 
exchanges. 
 Chapter VI describes the CRIMES model managed by SHSU through interviews 
with members of the user agencies. Similar to but more in-depth than the survey, the 
agencies describe their use of CRIMES and other information systems. The interviews 
uncovered information that some of the agencies had recently moved away from CRIMES 
as their RMS. The interviewed agencies provide an evaluation of the benefits and the 






Chapter VII discusses the findings in this research and the implications for leaders 
of law enforcement agencies. This chapter explores the removal of political barriers, 
improving governance, and marketing of information-sharing resources. 
Recommendations for improvements include regional agencies combining RMS, 
governmental sponsorship and funding, raising awareness of information resources, and 
mandatory participation in data exchanges. The conclusion is for chief executives to find 
the right combination of these recommendations to apply to their agency and improve law 







II. LAW ENFORCEMENT RECORDS MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
Like most organizations, law enforcement agencies maintain databases of 
information on employee personnel records, transaction records, financial records, 
customer information, and various other data that support the operation, effectiveness, and 
efficiency of the business. Law enforcement is similar to other industries in need of a 
functional and user-friendly information system. However, there are unique characteristics 
and requirements for RMS that create opportunities and challenges. Some of the more 
common information collected by RMS includes reports of crimes and personal details on 
both suspected and convicted criminals. RMS also contains reports of suspicious activity 
that may not be criminal in nature and a personal information database on persons who 
report activity to law enforcement agencies. RMS usually tracks stolen and recovered 
property as well as items booked as evidence. A modern and robust RMS is a critical 
element of an effective law enforcement agency. This chapter will describe RMS users and 
some of the RMS functions for law enforcement agencies.  
A. RMS USERS 
Every law enforcement agency at the national, state, and local levels must maintain 
detailed records as a function of laws and best practices. Although there may still be 
agencies that use paper and manual record-keeping systems, most law enforcement 
organizations use electronic systems to store and organize these records. Agencies use 
RMS for investigative and reporting functions, timekeeping and workload documentation, 
intelligence information, employee records, property and evidence records, and various 
other customized sections as needed. The RMS typically has an interface that connects with 
computer-aided dispatch (CAD) systems. In some cases, RMS may interface with regional, 
state, or national databases such as the N-DEx.21  
Every employee in a law enforcement organization is a potential user of the system. 
Police officers complete crime reports to document incidents from dispatched calls or self-
initiated activity. Officers use field contact records to document encounters with persons 
                                                 






they meet in suspicious circumstances while on patrol. Investigators later read records of 
field contacts to identify possible suspects from matching crime reports. Investigators also 
use the RMS to find patterns of criminal activity that match their assigned cases. 
Investigators update information as they complete casework and add supplemental 
information to existing crime reports. Officers and investigators alike look at intelligence 
reports and research criminal history information contained in the RMS. Analysts look at 
crime trends to provide data for decision-making. Analysts report tactical information to 
patrol officers or investigators based on the research of specific individuals or locations. 
Administrative clerks review files for quality control and reporting of agency crime data to 
state or national entities. Administrators look at jurisdictional crime trends to report to 
governing bodies and evaluate agency workload and staffing decisions. In short, the RMS 
may be the essential central operational piece of every law enforcement organization. 
Accurate data entry and quality control are of particular importance. Data entry standards 
and training should consider that future RMS consumers will access this information for 
myriad reasons, including gathering intelligence for analysis or investigation.22 
People outside of law enforcement agencies also have a stake in the RMS function. 
Insurance companies obtain copies of police reports to assist in claims investigations. 
Attorneys seek information from police reports to help their clients through independent 
investigations. Individuals seek criminal history information for employment background 
checks or other personal reasons. Journalists or other public interest groups may request 
publicly available information contained in RMS to further research projects. Governments 
and non-governmental organizations alike look at crime data to evaluate the safety of 
communities.  
RMS data holds great value for law enforcement agencies and the citizens of the 
communities they serve. The data’s accuracy and accessibility will directly affect the 
efficiency and effectiveness of a law enforcement agency. This information resource can 
also influence the safety, quality of life, and the community’s economic viability. 
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B. RMS FUNCTIONS 
The typical RMS will contain information on calls for service, documenting every 
time a police agency responds to a public request, including date and time. The call for 
service also contains location and contact information for the caller and the incident, a 
narrative of details gleaned from the caller, and additional details added by the call-taker, 
dispatcher, or assigned officer. A core component of RMS is the police reporting and case 
management system. When an officer completes a call for service, they may be required to 
prepare a crime report. If there is no crime at the incident, the officer may still complete an 
information report. Some systems include traffic crash reporting as a separate module. 
Whatever the report type, a link is established to the call for service so that any subsequent 
investigation can also access that original call information. The case management module 
tracks the investigative functions and progress of a criminal investigation. This information 
might include the investigator’s name and assignment and the case status, such as open, 
pending, cleared, or closed.  
Crime or information reports are valuable sources of information. The reports 
contain names, addresses, phone numbers, vehicle descriptions, and a free form narrative 
giving details of incidents. The free form narrative may be as important as any other RMS 
piece because it can contain a limitless description of events that cannot fit neatly into other 
required fields. The narrative provides human context to the data because it allows the 
documentation of suspicions or conclusions based on the officer’s experience. Undesirably, 
the narrative can also allow incorrect assumptions or bias to enter the reporting system. 
Another RMS function is to keep records on individual persons, including victims, 
witnesses, property owners, and suspects. This information comes from the crime and 
information reports completed by officers during calls for service. Self-initiated activities 
may also generate a report, such as when an officer observes a drunk driver and makes an 
arrest. Name records are a valuable tool for investigations because of the connections that 
can be made between persons, locations, and property. Officers often locate fugitives from 
justice by conducting a comprehensive search of name records and locating known 






The field contact record, also known as a field interview record, is a non-criminal 
report of contact between an officer and a person who may or may not be the subject of an 
investigation. An example of a field contact record might occur when an officer encounters 
a person walking in a business district during the nighttime. Although the officer observed 
no crime, they document the date, time, the person’s identifying information, and a 
narrative to describe the encounter. Investigators review field contact records to find 
potential criminal suspects, or in some cases, to provide an alibi. 
RMS also contains vehicle records, which can associate persons who are not the 
vehicle’s registered owner with a vehicle at a given date and time. Property records can 
help identify business owners after hours or the owner of stolen property located during 
investigations. Evidence records sustain the documented chain of custody and help 
investigators in tracking characteristics of evidence without physically observing the item.  
A robust RMS may contain modules such as traffic warnings and citations, 
personnel records, civil process records, protective order records, permits or business 
licenses, internal affairs records, and equipment management. An ideal system will also 
contain built-in administrative or statistical reports and analytical tools for crime 
analysis.23  
The Law Enforcement Information Technology Standards Council (LEITSC) 
provides detailed specifications for law enforcement RMS to provide a starting point for 
agencies developing requests for proposals (RFP).24  LEITSC published Standard 
Functional Specifications for Law Enforcement Records Management Systems to help 
agencies lower the costs of implementing and maintaining systems and encourage 
information sharing.25 The LEITSC recommendations help agencies prepare for the 
procurement of new or replacement systems. This information likely guides vendors as 
they research and develop systems to present to the market. 
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C. BIG BUSINESS FOR RMS VENDORS 
Because every law enforcement agency is likely to utilize an RMS, the industry is 
full of potential vendors. A quick search of the internet reveals dozens of companies that 
provide RMS for law enforcement. The research found herein reveals many different 
systems in use in the state of Texas. One can argue that competition is good for the market 
because it can stimulate innovation and keep prices lower. However, one problem with 
having so many different choices in the RMS market is creating multitudes of different 
systems, most of which do not directly share information with each other. Although basic 
standards are well documented, including the need to share data with other agencies’ 
systems, most companies produce “off-the-shelf” versions that must fit into an existing 
workflow. Customizations to these systems create added costs to the agency. Other systems 
may be custom built to fit an agency’s wants or needs and the whims of technology 
influencers who may or may not possess the actual expertise to make informed decisions. 
Vendors are happy to build and happier to bill, especially with lucrative maintenance 
agreements that guarantee company revenue for years, regardless of product performance. 
D. CHALLENGES FOR AGENCIES 
Law enforcement executives such as Chiefs and Sheriffs are frequently the officials 
who decide on system acquisitions. Often lacking the expertise on how a good RMS should 
work, these officials are left to conduct their own research or listen to vendor presentations 
and pick the option that seems most cost-effective while meeting minimum requirements. 
For complex RMS in larger agencies, it may become necessary to hire a consultant to 
navigate the entire process from RFP to implementation. The costs add up quickly, and 
taxpayers are left footing the bill for systems that may duplicate services among agencies 
in the same jurisdictional boundary. Knowing that these systems may not be able to 
communicate with each other, on the surface, appears to be wasteful. In some cases, such 
as the FBI VCF debacle, millions are spent on systems that epically underperform and fail 
to create a viable information system.26 
                                                 







So what makes it so challenging to create and use a statewide or nationwide RMS 
for law enforcement? The answer to this piece of the homeland security puzzle is 
complicated. RMS contains valuable and sensitive information. Much of RMS data is not 
public information, although state laws vary widely on what is or is not publicly 
disclosable. A great deal of RMS information is potentially incriminating or embarrassing 
or could expose a person to identity theft if revealed to nefarious actors. Therefore, the 
data’s privacy and protection must be a paramount consideration from the RFP through 
end-user access control. This research assumes that database security is of the utmost 
importance to agencies when considering RMS acquisition and ongoing use. Political, 
jurisdictional, and ownership questions also create obstacles to integration and sharing 
data. This thesis sorts through these challenges to develop recommendations for agencies 
to share information more efficiently, including their RMS. 
E. SUMMARY 
RMS serves a critical role in the law enforcement function, both for internal and 
external stakeholders. After the events of September 11, 2001, the intelligence and law 
enforcement communities were criticized for failing to connect separate pieces of 
information that could have prevented the terrorist attacks on the United States. Some of 
the information that can protect our communities and our nation lies with the vast data 
gathered by local law enforcement agencies. What follows next is an examination of the 














III. LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION COLLECTION AND 
SHARING 
Law enforcement agencies share and access information in a variety of different 
ways. The method or platform used is dependent upon the nature and origin of the data. 
This chapter will outline the most common sharing platforms and some advantages or 
limitations of each. 
A. NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER 
One of the earliest electronic platforms for sharing law enforcement records was 
the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). In 1967, the FBI launched NCIC to share 
information between participating agencies regarding stolen cars and license plates, stolen 
guns, and wanted persons.27 NCIC has since grown into a national database housing 
millions of records and processing as many as 17 million requests for information per 
day.28 Nearly every law enforcement agency in the United States uses NCIC.  
NCIC follows strict security controls and requires agencies to comply with many 
rules to maintain access to enter and retrieve information. These rules restrict the type of 
information that is entered into the system. Generally, this includes persons who have 
active warrants, stolen vehicles, stolen property serial numbers, missing persons, and 
persons who present a danger to law enforcement. However, the rules provide a rigorous 
process for ensuring that data is entered correctly and acted upon quickly to ensure the 
information system’s integrity.  
NCIC works very well to share information about wanted or missing persons or 
stolen vehicles. The narrow focus and strict controls make NCIC a valuable tool for law 
enforcement across the country. However, these limitations prevent the use of NCIC as a 
research tool for investigators. For example, a wanted person’s record in NCIC does not 
contain details about the crime; instead, it is merely a verification that a warrant exists. The 
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record focuses on identifying the person, the entering agency, and a related agency case 
number. The same holds for property and vehicle records. Therefore, NCIC is an excellent 
platform to locate persons or property nationwide, but not as useful when trying to research 
crime trends, travel patterns, or operation methods of criminal or terrorist organizations. 
Many states have similar and connected systems for locating persons and property. 
Texas law enforcement uses the Texas Crime Information Center (TCIC). The Texas 
Department of Public Safety (TxDPS) manages TCIC, which works alongside NCIC and 
may contain the same records. Law enforcement agencies are more likely to travel within 
the state to bring people in on misdemeanor crimes, so TCIC includes more misdemeanor 
warrants than NCIC. The limitations of TCIC are similar to NCIC in that it is a repository 
for missing or stolen property records and wanted and missing persons. TCIC also contains 
information on registered sex offenders in the state, alerts on dangerous criminals, and the 
presence of a protective order.29 
NCIC, TCIC, and other similar databases are vital tools for law enforcement. They 
provide easy access to criminal information from anywhere in the country. These databases 
are accessed millions of times per day by thousands of different agencies. The limited scope 
of information contained in these records prevents these platforms from being used as 
research tools. However, they do an excellent job of maintaining an easily verifiable 
database of information and can serve as a model for a nationwide information-sharing 
network that could have a broader array of data.  
B. FUSION CENTERS 
The events of 9/11 revealed that, among other things, federal, state, and local 
agencies charged with some aspect of keeping our country safe from criminals and 
terrorists were unable to put together the information needed to stop the attacks that 
occurred. A new mindset developed that caused the creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security. This new thinking spurred the development of fusion centers 
beginning in 2004. The DOJ defines a fusion center as a “collaborative effort of two or 
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more agencies that provide resources, expertise, and information to the center with the goal 
of maximizing their ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and 
terrorist activity.”30 Fusion centers seem like an excellent idea to solve the problems of 
information sharing. Their definition includes criminal activity and terrorist activity, which 
has appeal at the local and federal level. However, the literature on this topic reveals that 
the fusion center model also has significant limitations. 
Fusion Centers developed across the country in different forms. Initially, there was 
little guidance to direct the structure of the organizations. This organic development has 
led to similar problems as before 9/11. Disconnects are inherent in systems developed 
without consulting other similar systems and with little anticipation of connectivity. As of 
January 2021, there were 80 fusion centers spread out across the United States and its 
territories.31 Several states have more than one center, including Texas, which has eight. 
Some sources challenge the effectiveness and efficiency of fusion centers. One 
researcher identified a lack of a federated search system in at least one-third of fusion 
centers examined.32 This essential tool, which allows the user to search across multiple 
databases using a singular input, seems intuitively necessary for efficiency. In 2012, a 
Senate investigation into fusion centers issued a highly critical report of centers’ design 
and operations. This report outlined several criticisms and suggestions for improving 
fusion centers. Among the more harsh criticism was a scathing statement that “[fusion] 
centers themselves have fallen short of developing the capabilities necessary to 
meaningfully contribute to the Federal counterterrorism mission.”33 This statement is 
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disheartening because state and local governments developed fusion centers with this very 
mission at the forefront of their existence. 
The ACLU criticizes fusion centers for lack of a “proper legal framework.”34 While 
this statement intends to be critical of the lack of oversight in Constitutional regulation, it 
also speaks to the lack of uniform operation standards. With 80 separate fusion centers 
working, a lack of standards could be a significant hindrance to information being shared 
uniformly across these platforms. 
The outlook on fusion centers is not all negative. A House committee on homeland 
security issued a report in 2013 that was more optimistic. The committee found that one of 
the fusion center network’s strengths was a unique expertise and local perspective that each 
center brings to the process. The report concluded that “The Federal Government and State 
and local stakeholders must continue to provide the support that fusion centers require to 
continue to grow and develop, enabling the National Network to reach its full potential as 
a National asset and homeland security partner.”35 
Fusion centers attempt to bridge the intelligence gaps between federal, state, and 
local homeland security-focused agencies, including law enforcement. However, it is still 
unclear if individual law enforcement agencies are knowledgeable enough to adequately 
utilize fusion center products. Another question is whether or not they are willing and 
equipped to contribute information. If the answer is no, then it is unlikely that fusion centers 
can make significant contributions to improving homeland security. Although many 
individual success stories abound, there is no precise data to show that this model is 
working as intended. 
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C. REGIONAL INFORMATION SHARING SYSTEMS (RISS) 
The RISS organization consists of six regional centers across the United States that 
provide many information and resource sharing services. These RISS regions were 
established between 1973 and 1981.36 A regional law enforcement policy board manages 
each center, and Congress funds the overall program.37  The RISS model differs from 
fusion centers in that RISS deals primarily with criminal matters such as drug trafficking, 
organized crime, and gang activity. Fusion centers tend to focus more on connecting federal 
information to state and local agencies, focusing on terrorism, critical infrastructure, public 
health, and emergency response.38 
The RISS web portal contains crime bulletins from regional member agencies and 
generalized criminal intelligence publications. RISS also contains educational resources, 
including videos and publications designed to increase law enforcement knowledge about 
crime trends. RISS also provides information about law enforcement technology and can 
connect agencies with resources for loaned equipment such as automated license plate 
readers or investigative tools such as cameras and other surveillance equipment. The RISS 
web interface is a dashboard that contains links to other investigative resources such as N-
DEx, although the user must be a subscriber to those individual resources. 
A unique tool of RISS is the Officer Safety Event Deconfliction System, called 
RISSafe. RISSafe is a tool that law enforcement agencies can use to search for overlapping 
investigations. Besides avoiding interference in other agencies’ investigations, RISSafe 
can prevent dangerous cross-agency encounters. A key point of deconfliction is that all 
agencies with overlapping jurisdictional boundaries must participate. Otherwise, the 
system has considerable gaps in data that could render a single agency’s participation 
useless. Lack of knowledge about and lack of participation in these large information 
sharing systems is common among law enforcement agencies. 
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D. DATA EXCHANGES 
A data exchange serves as a repository for criminal information from numerous law 
enforcement agencies across different jurisdictional boundaries. Agencies can search, link, 
and share this information from other subscriber agencies. There is no mandate for agencies 
to participate in such data exchanges. An agency must provide an electronic interface 
between the agency RMS and the data exchange to share information. This interface creates 
added cost to the local RMS. 
The National Data Exchange (N-DEx) is the national example of this model. N-
DEx works with various state agencies to provide information across a wide array of law 
enforcement organizations. In Texas, for example, the Texas Data Exchange (TDEx) is 
managed by TxDPS and provides the portal for state agencies to access N-DEx. TDEx vets 
and controls individual and agency access to the system, which eases the administrative 
burden on N-DEx. To share data, the agency shoulders the burden of integration costs from 
their RMS vendor.39 Depending on the RMS architecture and size, this cost could vary 
greatly. TDEx and N-DEx expect subscriber agencies to contribute information; however, 
being a contributor does not appear to be a mandatory usage condition. This expectation is 
the primary and perhaps the only motivation to incur the associated costs of integration. 
For smaller and poorly funded agencies, the cost of building the interface could be a barrier 
to entry. 
Many Texas agencies surveyed were familiar with TDEx and N-DEx. AT the time 
of this writing, TDEx recently changed vendors, which created problems for agencies that 
use proprietary software for their local RMS. In the best cases, the vendor will work with 
the new TDEx vendor to ensure the RMS can connect. However, in some cases, the vendor 
charges a fee to write the appropriate code for the interface without revealing the source 
code to the TDEx vendor. If the agency cannot absorb the extra expense, their connection 
                                                 
39 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “National Data Exchange (N-DEx) Data Integration FAQs” 








is lost, and they no longer contribute information. As with RISS, the participation issue 
becomes a challenge as agencies reject the use of exchanges. 
The Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) maintains the Law Enforcement 
Information Network Exchange (LInX), representing another information-sharing source. 
According to LInX, over 2,000 agencies in the United States use this system.40 LInX 
maintains a partnership and connectivity with N-DEx and shares some data across the two 
platforms. Although LInX reports many subscribers and widespread use across the country, 
few Texas agencies surveyed were using this system. 
Data exchanges hold the potential to be valuable tools for law enforcement 
investigators and analysts, on the condition that agencies who subscribe to access the data 
also contribute like information. Additionally, agencies in similar geographic areas or who 
share jurisdictional boundaries should coordinate as to which system(s) they will use for 
information sharing. If these mutual agreements and consistency in contributing 
information are lacking, data exchanges leave large gaps in their networks and less 
effective for those who choose to use them. 
E. DATA WAREHOUSES 
A different model for information sharing is called a data warehouse. Data 
warehouses gather large amounts of historical data stored for research and analysis. The 
ideal warehouse model is the democratization of data that allows many users to investigate 
the information within without a choke point that limits otherwise authorized availability. 
Data warehouses are particularly useful for the analysis of large amounts of data. They are 
also used to access individual records. 
The Colorado Information Sharing Consortium (CISC) is one such model. CISC 
serves nearly eighty law enforcement agencies who contribute and access data from the 
system.41 LexisNexis Risk Solutions, a company that provides various data and analytics 
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solutions worldwide, hosts the Regional Data Warehouse (RDW) for CISC. LexisNexis 
performs the foundational data integration into the RDW for subscriber agencies and serves 
as the gatekeeper via an application programming interface (API). The API allows users to 
analyze the data, and an additional application is available for deeper analytic capabilities.  
Members of the CISC also have access to enhanced investigative tools, including a 
team of analysts. CISC also provides a portal to N-Dex and LInX. The CISC provides 
subscriber agencies with an in-depth resource of information to help criminal investigators 
and crime analysts. In case of RMS change or failure, the CISC can restore a contributing 
agencies’ data, which reduces risk to the individual organization.42 
As early as 2002, the Chicago Police Department (CPD) began work on a data 
warehouse that allows access to agencies from around the state and surrounding areas. The 
Citizen and Law Enforcement Analysis and Reporting (CLEAR) project give agencies 
throughout Illinois access to an RDW maintained by the CPD. After a pilot program was 
successful, the CPD embarked on a vigorous campaign to allow CLEAR access to any 
other area law enforcement agency at no cost.43  CPD also provided train-the-trainer 
sessions for the adopting agencies. This robust marketing combined with the zero cost for 
using the system made joining CLEAR an easy option for law enforcement agencies, and 
nearly four hundred agencies use CLEAR.44 
The City of Chicago also provides a data portal that includes a section for public 
safety information. This portal extracts CLEAR data to give the public free access to 
datasets such as all crimes reported, crime maps, and even police station locations.45 
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CLEAR represents an excellent example of public engagement and transparency in data 
collection and dissemination and provides law enforcement officers a tool to research 
crimes and criminals who jump jurisdictional boundaries of a heavily populated 
metropolitan area. 
F. SAME RMS VENDOR 
Although Texas municipal police agencies were the primary research area for this 
thesis, the author also spoke to the Ogden Police Department in Utah.46  Ogden police use 
the same RMS vendor as 13 other police agencies in the same geographical area. The 
department reported that officers could view, but not make changes to, RMS data from 
these neighboring agencies. This data includes such information as crime reports, arrest 
reports, name records, and vehicle records. The department considers the ability to share 
information with other agencies a benefit because many of the criminals they deal with in 
Ogden cross into other nearby jurisdictions.  
There are likely other examples of agencies collaborating on information sharing 
by using the same vendor. CRIMES was another potential example of this type of 
partnership. However, as will be discussed in Chapter VI, the ability to share information 
on the CRIMES RMS platform was not available to agencies at the time of this research. 
Nonetheless, this model holds promise for agencies with the foresight to work together 
before making an RMS acquisition. 
G. PRIVATE DATA RESOURCES 
Several companies engage in the collection and dissemination of data as a for-profit 
enterprise. Transunion offers a product called TLOxp for law enforcement use. TLOxp 
provides subscribers with an extensive resource of data on people, businesses, and assets 
and claims to have data on over 95% of the United States population.47 This data includes 
phone numbers, addresses, driver’s license information, social security numbers, and 
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employment information. TLOxp also provides historical information to include previous 
addresses, old phone numbers, vehicle ownership history, and prior familial relationships. 
Agencies pay a subscriber fee based on the amount of information accessed per month. The 
majority of law enforcement agencies surveyed for this thesis were familiar with and used 
TLOxp for investigative research. 
There are several other investigative databases on the market. LexisNexis Risk 
Solutions provides a product called Accurint for Law Enforcement. Accurin is similar in 
many ways to TLOxp. Thompson Reuters has another similar database called CLEAR. The 
Thompson Reuters database product should not be confused with CLEAR, which is a facial 
recognition and secure identification platform. Thompson Reuters CLEAR is also different 
than the previously described data warehouse in use by the Chicago police. TLOxp, 
Accurint, and Thompson Reuters CLEAR all provide similar services, but each has its pros, 
cons, and pricing schema. 
Many investigative solutions from non-governmental entities exist, and each can 
offer an alternative to traditional government-operated information networks. However, 
many companies rise and fall with good or bad leadership or with rapid technology changes 
that render once innovative solutions quickly irrelevant. The private market for data can be 
perplexing when seeking solutions to help with investigations or gathering intelligence. 
Law enforcement leaders should seek solutions based on an analysis of investigative and 
intelligence needs rather than making purchasing decisions based on vendor 
recommendations. It may also be prudent for agencies to avoid long-term contracts and 
frequently re-evaluate information services’ usefulness. Adequately vetted and sourced, 
privately owned data sources are valuable tools for law enforcement investigation and 
intelligence. 
H. PERSON-TO-PERSON CONTACT 
Law enforcement should not overlook the value of keeping personal contact with 
human sources in other agencies. Person-to-person contact, also known as human 
intelligence or HUMINT, is one of the oldest intelligence methods and maintains relevancy 
even with modern computing proliferation. In this research, several organizations reported 






criminal activity. One study found patterns in the way investigators contacted other 
agencies for information, including geographic proximity and similar size.48 The 
geographic relevancy of HUMINT seems intuitive since crime trends often follow regional 
patterns, irrespective of jurisdictional boundaries. If investigators tend to contact peers in 
regionally located agencies, it also seems logical to conclude that these agencies should 
share electronic records. By sharing records, the agencies can take advantage of computing 
technology to analyze large area crime trends and identify individuals or groups 
responsible for organized criminal or terrorist activity. However, in addition to the 
automated sharing of electronic records, personal contact between agencies should be 
encouraged. A good conversation can give more context to the situation and build trust and 
rapport between agencies. 
I. SUMMARY 
Information is gathered and shared by law enforcement agencies in various ways, 
both locally and on a national scale. The array of choices may be one factor inhibiting the 
effectiveness of information sharing. Agencies are left to decide what resources they will 
subscribe to and, significantly, what resources to which they will contribute information. 
Law enforcement should develop a common strategy to determine how agencies will share 
information. One alternative could be an extensive, federated records management and 
sharing system operated by a government agency. The next section will examine one such 
case; how an ambitious attempt to consolidate nationwide systems turned into an 
embarrassing and expensive debacle.  
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IV. CASE STUDY: THE FBI VIRTUAL CASE FILE 
Managing and sharing law enforcement records within a single interconnected 
system seems like an idea that could solve the problem of sharing data on a national scale. 
However, it is an idea with a troubled history. It is crucial to examine the lessons of 
successes and failures in technology aspirations and upgrades for law enforcement to form 
better recommendations for the future. Scholars of information technology management 
have studied and analyzed one such project, known as the FBI’s Virtual Case File (VCF), 
and later, the Sentinel program. The VCF project started as an ambitious and laudable 
attempt to update an antiquated and disconnected system that hampered one of the nation’s 
largest law enforcement agencies’ efficiency and effectiveness. It ended as a generally 
recognized failure and a monumental waste of taxpayer money. Sentinel repeated some of 
the missteps made during the VCF project but was eventually righted through innovative 
project development and management. Both systems provide valuable lessons for the 
creation of extensive records management and sharing systems. 
A. TRILOGY 
Well before the events of 9/11/2001, the FBI began working on upgrading its 
technology systems. The overarching project, which came to be known as Trilogy, 
consisted of three major components. The first was a massive upgrade of outdated 
hardware, including the desktop computers and servers used by field agents.49 The second 
piece was creating a web-based system that would allow for widespread sharing of 
information among agents. The third piece of Trilogy was to create a case information 
management system that could be used by agents spread out all across the United States. 
This system was the VCF, which was arguably one of the most valuable pieces of the 
upgrade. 
Before the Trilogy project proposal, FBI agents worked on outdated pieces of 
equipment. They relied on paper files for many transactions due in part to an arcane 
                                                 







electronic filing system and a general organizational resistance and distrust of existing 
electronic systems.50 Agents manually scanned papers into electronic systems but also kept 
paper backups. By the late 1990s it was evident that the Bureau required a new 
organizational system to improve efficiency. This forward-thinking vision meant new 
computers, new infrastructure, and a new records management system that agents could 
trust to be reliable and that could connect the information contained in 56 separate field 
offices and nearly 400 resident agencies across the country. 
In 2000, Congress approved $379.8 million for a proposal to span three years, a 
project that would become known as Trilogy.51 The project required two contractors 
because it was considered too large a project for one contractor to complete. Field offices 
received new desktop machines and servers as the hardware and software technology 
upgrades were completed; however, it took until April of 2004 to complete the 
infrastructure portions of the project.52 The FBI enhanced the communications 
infrastructure and installed secure and robust communication transportation networks. The 
last Trilogy piece, which was supposed to have been concurrently developed and 
implemented, was a records, evidence, and case management system. 
B. VIRTUAL CASE FILE 
Before conceptualizing the Trilogy project, the FBI used a program called 
Automated Case Support. As a part of the Trilogy enhancements, the FBI envisioned a 
system that would combine the functions of managing the various pieces of information 
required to be kept during a case investigation. One part of the system is records 
management, which is the fundamental recording and storing of an investigation’s detailed 
documentation. Evidence management is another part of the file and includes the 
documentation of the collection and storage of case-related evidence. A third critical piece 
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is case management, which is the organization of case files for prosecutorial presentation, 
the records of assignments for accountability, and the tracking of the investigation’s 
disposition. 
VCF was the solution to take care of all of the functions for investigation and hold 
the information in an environment that could be shared across all agency offices. In other 
words, an agent working in one part of the country could conceivably access records of an 
investigation that was occurring in an entirely different office hundreds of miles away. This 
type of system was precisely the type of information sharing that did not exist at the FBI 
at that time but was sorely needed. While this concept may seem simple in modern times, 
in 2000, the internet was not nearly as robust, and secure technologies were much less 
sophisticated. The VCF was a bold project, poised to create a nationwide network of 
information sharing for the FBI in a manner unlike anything seen before. 
C. PROBLEMS 
Unfortunately, the FBI appears to have inadequately organized the planning of the 
VCF portion of the project. The concept of agile development may have been a foreign 
term to those within the FBI tasked with driving the system’s development. For example, 
in 2003, there were over 400 change requests after the code was 25 percent completed, 
leading to tensions between the developer and the FBI.53 Another major factor was the 
events of 9/11, which happened as the Trilogy project was just getting started. 9/11 
highlighted the problems with the lack of information sharing within the FBI and spurred 
the agency to fast track Trilogy’s implementation and the development of the VCF. 
Congress approved additional spending to speed up the development, but the contracts 
failed to specify product acceptance criteria.54 In other words, the FBI did not and perhaps 
could not define what exactly they expected from VCF and when it would expect the 
finished product. 
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The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) issued a report in 2005 that outlined 
problems with the Trilogy development.55 One was the lack of an enterprise architecture 
plan to describe how the technology helps the organization accomplish its goals. The FBI 
lacked a detailed plan to define the requirements from the beginning of the project through 
completion.56 This disorganization created a series of new problems as definitions changed 
and conflicted with the previously completed work. The problem of the numerous change 
requests exacerbated the evolving design requirements. Project management was also an 
issue, as several changes in managers occurred during the VCF development. In 2002 
alone, there were four different information technology managers at the FBI.57 This lack 
of leadership continuity within the core segment of the organization responsible for 
managing VCF compounded many problems in developing a useful product. The OIG 
found other issues, including unrealistic schedules for the required tasks and a lack of 
acceptable project integration practices.58 
The various problems outlined by the OIG combined to add both cost and delays to 
the project. Although the infrastructure enhancements eventually came to fruition, the VCF 
development was never fully completed. The core piece of technology meant to solve the 
legacy issues within the FBI records system failed to meet even minimum expectations and 
was eventually abandoned in 2005. The project’s estimated sunk cost was $105 million, 
mostly in VCF code that was unusable.59 
D. THE SENTINEL SOLUTION 
Although the VCF project died, the need for a case management solution still 
existed. The FBI almost immediately regrouped and set out with a similar mission to 
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develop a singular system to manage cases and share information across all FBI offices. 
The new plan, called Sentinel, was bold and expensive, with an estimated cost of $425 
million over four implementation phases, each lasting 12–16 months.60 Sentinel got off to 
a good start in 2006, and the contractor completed phase one on time. Unfortunately, this 
project started to bog down in phase two, and then FBI Director Robert Mueller requested 
the OIG to audit the process and the contractors. The OIG expressed “serious concerns 
about the progress of the FBI’s Sentinel Project.”61 The FBI took delivery of several 
Sentinel segments by phase three, but it was evident that the software was not working as 
intended. 
In December 2008, Mueller brought in Chad Fulgham from the private sector to 
serve as the chief information officer, taking advantage of his corporate world experience. 
Fulgham eventually released the original contractor and brought the project back in-house 
to manage. Fulgham adopted an agile development strategy and completed Sentinel within 
the allotted budget.62 Although agents reported some problems after implementation, a 
2014 audit report concluded that most Sentinel users had a positive experience and the 
software was adequately performing the required functions.63 
E. LESSONS 
The harsh lessons learned from the VCF fiasco and the FBI’s resultant change of 
strategy can be a guidepost for other law enforcement agencies in developing large, shared 
systems. From the beginning, there must be a commitment from leadership to embrace an 
agile development process and to define the essential elements that the agency’s RMS must 
contain for a minimally viable product. In other words, start with a common-sense 
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approach to acquiring a system that will function with the agency mission in mind rather 
than trying to define abstract functions for end-users. Leadership should be asking 
questions such as, “What problem do we need to solve, and can we do it with technology?” 
A simple example of this scenario is figuring out a way to track an individual’s 
criminal activities across several state lines. If a truck driver is suspected of kidnapping in 
Oklahoma City, how can that information be available to an investigator looking for a 
missing person in Albuquerque? The problem presented here is how to develop a lead when 
the suspect is highly mobile. The solution is to ensure that two separated agencies can see 
the same information and detect similarities using a system that automatically flags the 
possible connections. 
The development of Sentinel created the solution that the FBI was seeking for 
records management and data sharing across a wide geographical area. However, it was a 
very costly system and took over six years to develop into a useable product. Sentinel 
solved a problem for one law enforcement agency but did not address information sharing 
across multiple agencies. The Sentinel solution’s complexity creates valuable knowledge 
for other organizations that desire to create similar extensive information management and 
sharing networks. 
The looming question here is whether a large shared RMS system is practical for 
nationwide use by state and local officers, given the complexity of law enforcement duties 
in the thousands of different agencies across the United States. Who would run such a 
system, and what laws would govern it? With current information systems, the possibilities 
are widely varied and inconsistent. Planners must consider the numerous vendors, data 
exchanges, and data warehouses that factor into any new project. Differing political 
jurisdictions are likely to have unique records management requirements, and varying state 
laws could interfere with interstate sharing. Privacy laws could hamper federal agencies 
from sharing information with state and local police departments. Lessons learned from the 
VCF debacle and the Sentinel project point towards the exploration of alternative solutions. 
Municipal police organizations comprise the largest number of independent law 
enforcement organizations in the country. These organizations work under differing state 






primarily at Texas agencies to reduce the variance in laws between states and identify 
criminal and intelligence system sharing and alternatives. The next chapter examines Texas 
police departments’ information systems and how those systems and agencies 














V. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY-SURVEY  
This research was designed to find better ways that law enforcement can share 
information. It is essential to get an expansive view of what is already happening in this 
realm in order to find out where to improve. Texas has over 1900 different law enforcement 
agencies, with over 700 of those being municipal police agencies.64 Law enforcement 
organizations include the state police, county sheriff’s offices, constable’s offices, 
municipal police departments, and dozens of other miscellaneous agencies that perform 
essential law enforcement functions. Texas has one of the largest varieties of law 
enforcement agencies, and each type has both unique and overlapping jurisdiction and 
functions with other agencies. To narrow the scope of this research, the focus of interviews 
and surveys were municipal police agencies in Texas. This study looks at municipal police 
departments to better understand how organizations with similar functions interact and 
what tools they use to gather intelligence or investigate crimes. 
A. SURVEY RESULTS 
The survey portion of this research was designed to find answers to reveal the 
variety of different RMS, the frequency of automated information sharing, and other data 
sources for investigation or intelligence. If the agency responded that they used CRIMES 
as their RMS, the survey revealed a second section. The second set of questions elicited 
additional information on CRIMES from agencies not part of the separate interview 
research. Police agencies that participated in the CRIMES personal interviews did not 
receive the survey solicitation to prevent duplication of responses. The survey request went 
to 642 municipal police agencies in Texas via email. There were 125 completed surveys 
returned. The survey responses were analyzed collectively and individually to look for 
patterns of information sharing or the lack thereof. The end of the survey allowed the 
participant to provide contact information for follow-up interviews. The follow-up 
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interviews attended to the same questions as the survey while seeking clarification of the 
responses and expanding the answers. 
1. Agency Size 
The first question asked the respondent to categorize the agency’s size by the 
number of sworn law enforcement officers. The categories were under 50, 51–100, 101–
250, 251–500, and over 500. This design categorized the agency size from small to mid-
sized to large. Over 73% of the responding agencies had less than 50 officers. Only one 
responding agency had more than 500 officers (see Table 1). There were no discernable 
patterns from the survey revealing whether the organization’s size was a factor in that 
agencies’ participation in a shared RMS. The same was true as to the likelihood of the 
organizational use of other data and investigative resources. 
 
Table 1. Number of sworn officers 
 
 
2. RMS Vendor 
The second question asked, “What vendor does your agency use for its records 
management system (RMS)?” The results revealed that the 125 agencies were using 21 
different RMS. Nine of the vendors appeared only once, while the other vendors appeared 
two or more times in the answers, as demonstrated in Figure 1.  











Figure 1.  Number of agencies per vendor 
 
3. Sharing RMS 
The third question in the survey asked, “Does your agency share the RMS platform 
with another agency or agencies?” This question was designed to find out how many 
agencies are sharing their core RMS with another agency. The responses included the 
possibility that the agency shared RMS with more than one other agency. Table 2 shows 







Table 2. Sharing RMS 
 
 
Analysis of these responses did not reveal any discernable connection between the 
organization’s number of officers and the agency’s likelihood to share RMS with another 
agency. It is possible that analysis could reveal connections between agency size and the 
likelihood of sharing RMS services with one or more agencies given a more extensive data 
set. Overall, 62% of agencies surveyed did not share their RMS with other agencies. 
4. Other Sources of Information 
Question number four asked, “Besides local RMS and NCIC, what other crime 
information databases does your agency use to conduct investigations or gain intelligence 
information?” This question reveals the number of agencies using other resources outside 
of their RMS and the types of resources most often used. One of the answer options allowed 
for an open-ended response to reveal potentially unknown sources of information. Some 
data resources were mentioned by only one agency and were not included in the summary 
shown in Figure 2. 
The survey found that 60% of the agencies surveyed used some type of fusion 
center product, while 48% used N-DEx as a source of information. Less than 17% of the 
agencies used RISS to share or collect information for investigations or intelligence. This 
number is deficient considering the widespread reach of RISS, which includes the entire 
state of Texas. Other resources reported to be used by more than one Texas agency included 
TLOxp, Accurint, and Thompson Reuters CLEAR. LeadsOnline appeared in slightly more 
than 5% of the responses. LeadsOnline is a resource that tracks property through pawnshop 
records. Pawnshop employees enter the data of pawned goods, usually to comply with local 
or state laws that require these types of businesses to keep detailed records of transactions. 
No, we are the only agency connected to this RMS. 78 62.4%
Yes, we share RMS with another law enforcement agency. 17 13.6%






Law enforcement agencies can subscribe to LeadsOnline, which allows the agency to 
search the records and identify potentially stolen items.  
 
Figure 2.  Agencies using other information resources 
Three municipal police agencies identified the Texas Workforce Commission 
(TWC) as a source for information. TWC keeps unemployment insurance records that can 
help identify the location of suspected criminals or fugitives from justice. In some cases, 
TWC records can also assist in investigating fraud cases by identifying employment 
periods for persons who otherwise claim to be injured or unemployed. 
Four of the agencies who used Kologik as their RMS also listed COPsync as an 
external resource for information. Kologik is the parent company of COPsync. Although 
COPsync officially refers to the mobile software platform by the same name, Kologik 
produces the RMS. The COPsync name was used interchangeably with Kologik RMS in 
the survey responses. Follow-up interviews revealed that because agencies on the 
Kologik/COPsync RMS system can see data from other Kologik/COPsync agencies, this 
was considered a valuable resource for investigative and intelligence information. 
However, the data was not included in this question analysis group because 






5. Direct Sharing Connections to RMS 
Question number five solicits information on whether agencies have direct 
connections to share information by asking, “Does your agency directly share or provide 
data (such as through an interface or API) to another database such as RISS or NDE-x?” A 
“yes” answer left an open-ended response for the agency to report the system’s name with 
which they were sharing information. Over 80% of the responding agencies reported they 
were not sharing information in this manner. The remaining responses included sharing 
with N-DEx, RISS, LInX, or miscellaneous other sources (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3.  Agencies who share to other databases 
It is apparent from this survey that the vast majority of Texas police agencies are 
not directly sharing data with a known information-sharing system. Additionally, out of 
the 60 agencies who report using N-DEx to gather information, only 19 provide 
information back to N-DEx through a direct connection. The implication here is that Texas 
agencies are far less willing or able to provide information to N-DEx than they are to access 






The remaining survey questions were viewable only to agencies who selected 
CRIMES as their RMS. An analysis of these additional survey questions is combined with 
the personal interview analysis and the CRIMES case study in the next chapter. 
B. SURVEY ANALYSIS  
This research reveals some interesting data about information sharing at Texas 
municipal police agencies. In this study, 125 agencies used 21 different RMS vendors. 7% 
of the agencies used systems that were not reported by any other agency. If 7% of all Texas 
police agencies have a unique individual system, there could be as many as 50 different 
RMS vendors used by municipal police in Texas. This diversity of systems highlights the 
problem of systems not connecting to each other due to an array of disconnected and 
sometimes proprietary systems. 
Nearly 38% of the agencies reported sharing their RMS with other police 
organizations. A closer analysis identified that some RMS vendors provide a sharing 
mechanism as an inherent part of their product. However, the agencies varied in their 
response to whether or not they were using or were aware of that RMS vendor’s sharing 
capability. 
Right at 60% of responding agencies reported that they utilize fusion center services 
for additional criminal or intelligence information. The frequency of each organization’s 
fusion center utilization was not measured in this survey and could be a future study topic. 
Less than half of the agencies used N-DEx as a resource. This issue was explored through 
personal interviews with some of the responding agencies. The primary reason for not 
using N-DEx was a lack of knowledge on what N-DEx can provide to investigators or 
analysts. Another reason for the lack of usage was the complexity of accessing the system. 
In Texas, the TDEx portal allows access to N-DEx. However, at the time of this study, 
TDEx was changing the vendor that hosts the TDEx service. Another way to access N-
DEx is through the LEEP portal; however, several agencies were unfamiliar with the 
credentialing process to access the connection via LEEP. 
A smaller number of agencies reported using RISS. Follow-up interviews revealed 






investigative needs. The few police departments who do use RISS found it valuable for 
getting criminal information related to gangs. Others found RISS (RISSafe) very helpful 
as a tool for deconfliction.65 
The Texas Workforce Commission (TWC) provides a wide variety of services to 
employers and employees in Texas, including training and placement services and the 
administration of unemployment benefits.66 In the process of conducting business, this 
agency collects a great deal of data about where people are working or if they are 
unemployed, along with their contact information. This survey identified that TWC 
information contained in unemployment insurance records is subject to disclosure to police 
departments. TWC makes agreements with law enforcement agencies to access the data 
for a fee based on the number of persons who will access the data.67 
Non-governmental agencies collect vast amounts of information and provide 
products used for investigative or intelligence information. These products appear to have 
evolved from credit reporting organizations and other companies that specialize in large 
volumes of personal data collection. Although this extensive data collection has been 
around for decades, the use of these products by law enforcement is not as prolific as 
expected. While some agencies were not aware of such products, others cited the cost of 
subscriptions as being a barrier to obtaining the service. Agencies who do not have the 
excess capacity in their budget are likely to view these resources as a luxury they cannot 
afford. The most common use for these commercial databases was locating suspects and 
fugitives from justice. 
Perhaps the most startling information gained from this survey is that 80% of the 
police departments who responded reported that they did not directly share their RMS 
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information with N-DEx, RISS, or other information exchanges. The lack of data being 
pushed out is an inherently obvious problem with the overall information-sharing 
landscape. Suppose this data holds true for other types of law enforcement in the state and 
other law enforcement agencies in the rest of the country. In that case, there is a large piece 
of missing information in the law enforcement and homeland security enterprise.  
C. LIMITATIONS OF THE SURVEY 
One of the primary limitations of this survey is the relatively small sample size. 
Given that only 19.5% of police departments responded to the survey request, there is likely 
information missing from this analysis. It is possible that agencies who see information 
sharing as an issue were more or less likely to respond to the survey, or that agencies who 
lack information sharing capabilities were more or less likely to report this issue. 
This survey does not explore the individual customizations that vendors might 
apply at agencies that allow information linking between other agencies who use that same 
RMS. The answers reveal that this is occurring, but it is also apparent that not all agencies 
have the same capabilities, even when using the same software vendor. There may also be 
a lack of full understanding of the full RMS potential at the responding agency. For 
example, some agencies that reported using Kologik/COPsync responded that they could 
share information with every other agency that also used Kologik/COPsync. However, 
other agencies with the same RMS reported that they did not share RMS information. There 
is some discrepancy in organizational knowledge. A more in-depth study is needed to 
determine if each agency has a customized version of the RMS or if the users simply do 
not understand how to maximize the record-sharing potential. 
Another limitation in this study is the type of agencies that were the subject of 
inquiry. The numerous Texas agencies have different law enforcement duties, but many of 
these functions overlap with municipal police agencies’ responsibilities. The RMS and 
other information-sharing requirements would likely be similar in these types of agencies. 
However, some significant differences are bound to appear, for example, in organizations 
that are responsible for operating a jail. Those agencies would likely look for RMS or 






of work and essential job functions of municipal police agencies reduced the need to adjust 
for these differing RMS and information sharing priorities. 
The issue of information management is very complex, and it is possible that some 
respondents failed to understand the context of the questions. For example, question 
number four asks, “Besides local RMS and NCIC, what other crime information databases 
does your agency use to conduct investigations or gain intelligence information?” Some 
respondents included NCIC in their open-ended responses to this question. Others included 
Kologik/COPsync, which is very much a local RMS, albeit Kologik/COPsync connects 
information with other COPsync agencies. 
The survey limitations do not invalidate the learned assumptions about how law 
enforcement records are shared. From this survey, it is clear that comprehensive 
information sharing between Texas municipal police agencies is not happening. The next 
chapter will look at the CRIMES RMS and how user agencies describe the benefits and 






VI. THE CRIMES MODEL IN TEXAS 
One model to solve the problem of information sharing between law enforcement 
agencies is to have agencies share their core records management systems. Sharing RMS 
between agencies sounds simple at first glance. With the advent of cloud-based solutions 
and remotely hosted storage options, sharing RMS is a theoretical possibility at every law 
enforcement level. Unfortunately, as observed in the FBI case study from Chapter IV, each 
added network node multiplies the system’s complexities, as does each user request for 
jurisdictional or situation-specific capabilities. 
Some law enforcement organizations share the same RMS among multiple 
agencies, and one such system exists in Texas. Sam Houston State University (SHSU) 
operates an information system for law enforcement organizations called Criminal 
Research Information Management Evaluation System (CRIMES), which has over 50 
subscriber agencies. CRIMES includes CAD, RMS, and several other standard record-
keeping modules used by law enforcement agencies. CRIMES is unique in that a university 
operates and maintains the system as a non-profit project that supports law enforcement 
research and operations.68 This chapter will look at information systems as described by 
CRIMES users. The evaluation of CRIMES includes agency perspectives on the benefits 
and the problems they have encountered.  
A. HOW CRIMES STARTED 
SHSU has historically been a research institution for law enforcement scholars. 
CRIMES began as a project designed by SHSU to speed up and make more straightforward 
access to raw crime data from Texas agencies.69 SHSU collaborated with several law 
enforcement organizations in Texas to mine crime data for scholarly research in criminal 
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justice and eventually built an automated repository for RMS data to use for the research. 
They agreed to return datasets to departments when requested. Eventually, some of the 
police chiefs asked the university if it would be possible for SHSU to host the data and 
allow the police agency to log back in to do criminal investigation research. SHSU built 
the system as requested. This hosted solution soon evolved into the CRIMES model as 
SHSU built an RMS and a CAD software solution. 
As the project grew and evolved, the university saw the need to expand research 
and created new CRIMES components. The expansions eventually added mobile 
components, incident (case) management, booking and jail management, traffic citations, 
traffic crash reporting, and property room management to the core modules.70 The 
CRIMES project was provided as a subscription service to offset the growing cost of setting 
up and maintaining the system. Subscriber agencies had to provide the necessary local 
hardware, but initially, CRIMES maintained a hosted software platform at the university. 
The subscription price is based on the number of officers at the agency. 
When TDEx arrived on the scene as a data exchange in Texas, SHSU eventually 
abandoned the hosted solution and moved the software out to the agencies. The CRIMES 
managers understood the value of TDEx’s information-sharing capabilities, and CRIMES 
was configured to connect to TDEx easily. Since changes began occurring at TDEx, some 
agencies have requested that CRIMES revert to a hosted solution so they can again have 
access to records from other departments. SHSU is currently exploring this option, and 
several of the agencies interviewed for this research were anxiously hoping for this change.  
B. METHODOLOGY OF THE INTERVIEWS 
Dr. Larry Hoover from SHSU was a longtime administrator over the CRIMES 
project and provided a list of 53 subscriber agencies that the author used to develop a list 
of potential interview subjects.71 The agency list included sheriff’s offices, university 
                                                 
70 Police Research Center, “Criminal Research, Information Management and Evaluation System 
(CRIMES).” 
71 Dr. Larry Hoover, Director of the SHSU Police Research Center,  provided the user agency list and 






police departments, and community supervision and corrections departments. The author 
chose municipal police agencies for the interview requests to keep the research scope in 
line with the survey model. The author sent requests to 36 municipal police departments, 
and 13 of them agreed to the interviews. In some cases, the agency chief was the 
interviewee, while in others, a records manager or other resident RMS expert provided the 
information. Four of the participating agencies had recently moved away from CRIMES to 
another RMS vendor but agreed to talk about their experience with CRIMES. The author 
sent interviewees an advance list of the interview questions. 
The interview questions revealed how the agency uses CRIMES and how they 
connect to other investigative or intelligence information sources. The interview also 
produced a qualitative evaluation of CRIMES as an information management system. The 
interviews showed that none of the CRIMES users were sharing their RMS with another 
agency. This lack of sharing is a result of the changes that CRIMES made after the 
proliferation of TDEx. Some of the agencies had heard that CRIMES was considering a 
hosted, centralized solution. Every respondent agreed that a hosted solution that could 
share information among the other CRIMES agencies would significantly improve the 
system’s value.  
C. INTERVIEW AND SURVEY RESULTS 
The municipal police departments that use CRIMES are mostly smaller to medium-
sized agencies. The mean number of police officers in the responding agencies was 60, 
while the median was 65. The largest responding agency had 120 officers, and the smallest 
had 14. The agencies served an average population size of 26,585 persons. The author 
looked at the number of police officers for all 53 agencies listed as current or recent 
CRIMES subscribers. The largest agency on the list had 297 officers. 
The interview questions followed similar lines as the survey, and one question 
asked what other databases the agency was using to conduct investigations or gather 
intelligence outside the RMS. These organizations reported using several of the sources 
identified by respondents in the Chapter 5 surveys. Additionally, two agencies used the 
Texas Gang Intelligence Index (TXGANG) as an intelligence resource. TXGANG is “a 






agencies within Texas.”72 One department reported using LiNX for investigations. All of 
the agencies reported using at least one external resource. Figure 4 shows the number of 
interviewed agencies using an identified investigative resource. 
 
Figure 4.  Interviewed agencies using other data sources 
The next two questions discussed what fusion center the department accessed and 
what information users gained from fusion centers. Two of the agencies reported not using 
fusion center products. The others used one of four centers: Texas Fusion Center (TxFC), 
Ft. Worth Intelligence Exchange (FWINTEX), The North Texas Fusion Center (NTFC), 
or the Dallas Fusion Center (DFC). Figure 5 shows the number of interviewed agencies 
using each fusion center.  
                                                 








Figure 5.  Fusion centers used by interviewed agencies 
The answers varied as to what products or information agencies obtained from 
fusion centers. Two respondents stated they were unsure what information they routinely 
received from fusion centers. The other agencies reported that fusion centers provide useful 
information and intelligence to law enforcement. Those agencies reported receiving 
products and information such as: 
• Deconfliction  
• Wanted person and stolen property bulletins  
• Intelligence on anticipated protests 
• Narcotics trafficking  
• Gang intelligence 
• Help in the identification of suspected criminals 
• Police reports from other agencies 
• Facial recognition  
• Crime trends in specific geographic areas 






The next topic for the interview identified whether the agency was accessing N-
DEx for information. Seven of the police agencies used N-DEx for criminal investigations, 
and six did not. Some agencies reported using N-DEx to access police reports from other 
agencies while investigating criminal cases. Others used historical address, phone, and 
vehicle information for tracking fugitives. Six of the agencies reported accessing N-DEx 
through the TDEx portal, and one used the LInX portal. Five of the agencies regularly 
accessed RISS for criminal or intelligence information. 
The last part of the interview covered questions specific to the CRIMES RMS. 
These questions evaluated CRIMES using qualitative responses. These were the same 
questions asked in the survey responses for agencies that reported using CRIMES. There 
were nine agencies in the survey using CRIMES and nine in the interviews. The interviews 
provided more in-depth responses, as encouraged by the author. However, this analysis 
combines responses from both the survey and the interviews. 
The first question in this section asked, “What functions does your agency believe 
CRIMES performs best?” The responses to this question were open-ended, but several 
similarities stood out. The first is that seven different agencies included the CAD and 
mobile software in this category. Some agencies described it as “very easy to use” and 
“simple.” The overall simplicity of CRIMES functionality both in CAD and RMS was a 
common theme in the interviews. However, some respondents viewed simplicity as a 
negative trait because of the lack of in-depth analytic capabilities. 
Another common theme was the ease of customization, and six agencies listed this 
as one of the positive traits of CRIMES. Five agencies reported excellent customer service 
as a performance measure. Interviews revealed that the CRIMES staff was very responsive 
to requests for custom reports or features. In contrast, one agency that had recently moved 
away from CRIMES reported poor customer service as one factor that caused them to 
consider a different RMS. Another noted minor syntax errors in the user interface that 
detracted from the professionalism of the product. Overall, the police departments 
considered customization and customer service to be beneficial to their organizations. 
The next question asked whether the agency considered CRIMES an effective RMS 






the simplicity and cost of the system. Seven different agencies reported the low cost as a 
being factor in the overall effectiveness of CRIMES. Most agreed that the lower cost than 
commercial software products was a good value, even when considering the reduced 
functionality of CRIMES vs. commercial products. The effectiveness was consistently tied 
to the ease of use and simplicity of the system. 
Not everyone considered CRIMES to be effective. Five agencies described 
problems with getting consistent results when retrieving information in the form of 
statistical reports. Specifically, they reported not getting the same results when running the 
same report at different times. One agency subscriber identified the lack of detailed 
statistical reporting as a performance measure that reduces the effectiveness of CRIMES. 
Another agency indicated that CRIMES is unable to create relationships between people, 
cars, and addresses. This feature is essential for investigators when trying to connect 
criminal incidents with suspects or when searching for fugitives. Creating relationships to 
master name records is one of the standard functional specifications outlined by LEITSC.73 
Four of the police departments had recently moved away from CRIMES as their 
RMS. Two of them were using Central Square two were using Spillman Flex. The primary 
reason for moving away from CRIMES was the lack of robust analytics and some concerns 
about the statistical inconsistency. One of these departments identified concerns that 
CRIMES was slow in responding to the federal mandate switch to the National Incident-
Based Reporting System. The same department was also interested in sharing and seeing 
data from other agencies, which CRIMES was unable to do at the time. Another agency 
reported that the mobile component was too slow, and the police officers were frustrated 
with the system. The simplicity and minimalism that attracts some agencies to CRIMES 
also appear to be factored in some agencies’ departure. 
D. ANALYSIS 
CRIMES started as a tool to provide academic researchers in criminal justice direct 
access to crime data. It has evolved into an information management system that competes 
                                                 






directly with the vendors in the private sector. This model seems to work well for agencies 
on a constrained budget or agencies that cannot develop and maintain an elaborate RMS 
proposal. One agency noted the low cost of entry because there is no software start-up or 
installation costs. Instead, the agency provides the specified hardware, and SHSU provides 
the installation as part of the subscription cost. This low entry barrier model appeals to 
smaller-agency executives who must acquire and sustain one of the essential technology 
pieces of every law enforcement organization. 
Unfortunately, the CRIMES model may not be well suited for use by large agencies. 
Project manager Suman Malempati identified two challenges for growing the system to 
meet the demands of larger police organizations. One challenge is the fact that the 
university facilitates the system as a non-profit research venture. Building and maintaining 
RMS for law enforcement is not a core responsibility of the university. Although the project 
serves a valuable research purpose, it is unlikely to see significant financial investment 
from the university for future research and development. This constraint keeps the system 
operating at a nominal level with unlikely hope of dramatic technological advancement. 
Another challenge is that some agencies require or request additional features that 
CRIMES cannot provide due to the research and development capacity limitations. Larger 
agencies tend to have more complex and demanding needs, reducing the likelihood that 
CRIMES will be seen as a viable RMS solution. 
The conversion of CRIMES to a hosted solution will improve the system, provided 
that a federated search capability allows agencies to search across jurisdictional 
boundaries. Unfortunately, the limited number of agencies that use CRIMES will hamper 
the effectiveness of a federated search. A connection to TDEx and N-DEx will be a 
desirable feature to increase information sharing that CRIMES can provide. Agency 
executives expect an RMS to provide consistent statistical analysis, so any discrepancies 
in this area will need to be addressed. 
Despite some of the limitations and problems, CRIMES provides a good RMS 
platform for small and medium-sized agencies that do not have a long list of unique 






the cost of CRIMES will likely have to increase to support a sustainable future. In the 
meantime, CRIMES users can expect a simple, straightforward RMS solution. 
E. LIMITATIONS 
One significant limitation of this case study is the small number of agencies that 
participated in the interviews. The addition of CRIMES agencies from the survey doubled 
the number of respondents on this topic. Although the survey questions on CRIMES were 
the same as the interview questions, the agency interviews significantly increased the depth 
of information gleaned about the system. 
Another limitation to the study may be the persons who were interviewed. The 
author contacted the police chief of each organization to request access to the agency 
personnel who were most knowledgeable about their RMS. In some cases, the chief 
completed the interview, but the chief assigned another department employee in other 
cases. It is possible that the person being interviewed was not the RMS expert or had a bias 
for or against CRIMES. Additionally, other persons in the agency may have voiced 
different views about CRIMES and the other information sources used by that agency. 
Several interviewees reported that they had checked with other people in their agency to 
answer some of the questions. 
There are many vendors for RMS and likely many possible solutions to improving 
information sharing among law enforcement agencies. The CRIMES model is one option 
for Texas agencies, although such a system’s continued development will need significant 
financial backing. The efficiency and effectiveness of crime control and terrorism 
prevention depend upon reliable and robust networks of information that multiple agencies 
can share, up to and including the federal government. The next chapter will combine the 
conclusions from this research to develop recommendations for law enforcement 


















VII. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Records management and information systems are an essential part of the law 
enforcement organization. Most law enforcement officers agree that sharing this 
information between agencies is an essential component of information systems. The rapid 
progression of information technology makes it possible to communicate large amounts of 
information across the country in seconds. Information storage capabilities continue to 
grow, as do the opportunities for artificial intelligence to process data in ways only 
imagined 30 years ago. Why, then, is it so difficult to share this information on a 
widespread basis across law enforcement organizations in the United States or even with 
other countries? 
A. BARRIERS TO SHARING 
In a world where search engines and algorithms dominate most aspects of learning 
and entertainment, it seems logical that law enforcement would have easy solutions 
available to access vast amounts of criminal and intelligence information. Unfortunately, 
as this thesis reveals, what exists is not nearly as robust as what is actually possible. Many 
police agencies continue to be silos of information, segregated from sharing information 
with bordering jurisdictions. These organizations remain stagnated in bureaucratic policies 
or under-budgeted technologies that inhibit investigators and analysts from gathering 
information from what should be reasonably simple searches of singular or connected 
systems. 
The potential problems of politics are one barrier to the implementation of shared 
systems. Even though many agency executives are appointed and somewhat insulated from 
political influences, city councils and county commissions approve law enforcement 
agencies’ funding. Funding priorities for adjoining agencies may not line up during the 
same budget cycles. Furthermore, these governing bodies often turn over after two or four 
years, leading to priorities changes. Implementing an RMS acquisition or change may 
require several years from concept to completion and is likely to span more than one 
iteration of an elected government. Albeit an extreme example, as discussed in Chapter IV, 






Another problem examined in this thesis is the issue of data ownership. Two of the 
agency respondents in the research interviews reported that agency ownership issues 
prevented them from consolidating RMS with a neighboring agency. RMS users in both 
agencies saw the value of accessing information directly from the other. Unfortunately, the 
organizational leadership was unable to work through and find a solution. Historically, law 
enforcement agencies have struggled with sharing information between agencies out of 
fear of losing control of data or not knowing what will happen to their data.74 This problem 
can be exacerbated by political foes or agency executives who don’t get along. What is 
required is an educated understanding of the value of sharing and consolidating resources. 
Much like the standardization of radio communications systems, political leaders and law 
enforcement executives must learn to see interoperability of information systems as 
mutually beneficial.  
B. GOVERNANCE 
There is a lack of governmental regulation that mandates guidelines for building 
single or multi-agency information systems that can easily share information. Such policies 
exist in other homeland security realms, such as standard emergency 911 call specifications 
outlined by the FCC for decades, which are the same for all phone carriers.75 Despite 
standard specifications for RMS and guidelines for information exchange standards, no 
regulation seems to be in place to require vendors or law enforcement agencies to share 
information. The National Information Exchange Model (NIEM) provides useful guidance 
to help agencies share essential information in emergencies and daily operations.76 Making 
these standards mandatory among law enforcement RMS in the United States would be a 
step toward better sharing information.  
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 Related to standardization is the problem of vendors who create proprietary 
databases and algorithms that limiting the agency’s ability to share data without the 
additional expense of a custom-built interface.77 Although some agencies can afford this 
expense, many cannot, and thus the propriety of an RMS becomes a barrier to sharing 
information. The vendor’s propriety level should be a significant consideration for agency 
executives in the procurement process of upgrading or replacing an information system. 
C. MARKETING AND TRAINING 
Although the sample of agencies in this thesis is small, it is clear that police 
organizations would benefit from more information or training on information access. One 
area is fusion centers. Fusion centers provide a significant amount of support and helpful 
products to aid law enforcement. However, one must know what questions to ask and be 
aware of the existence of these resources. Of the police departments surveyed for this 
thesis, 40 percent did not list fusion centers as a resource for information or intelligence. 
For this reason, it is reasonable to conclude that it would be beneficial for fusion centers to 
consider how they are (or are not) marketing their presence and capabilities. 
The same could be said for improving the visibility of RISS and N-Dex, as both of 
these systems provide valuable data and resources. RISS provides gang intelligence, 
deconfliction services, investigation support, and equipment loans in certain 
circumstances; however, less than 20 percent of the respondents seemed to understand 
RISS or how to access it. N-DEx gives agencies a way to connect with each other, even 
while using different RMS platforms. The information on N-DEx seems to be more 
widespread, and NDE-x has the endorsement of the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police along with many other large law enforcement organizations.78 These endorsements 
likely increase the visibility of N-DEx, but additional marketing would help more agencies 
understand the potential benefits to membership. 
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One crucial aspect of improving the presence of any of these sharing tools is 
training. Agency administrators should educate themselves on what tools are available to 
improve information sharing. Likewise, they are responsible for training their staff on the 
importance of good research, the availability of these tools, and how to access them. The 
agency head may also need to provide proper credentialing for the agency and the employee 
to access one or more systems. Additionally, the agency must commit one or more 
employees to maintain the credentialing process. During this research, one agency 
interviewed revealed that the process for maintaining credentials with N-DEx was too 
complicated, and the agency lost interest in keeping that connection. A commitment to 
training and allocating personnel to maintain linkage to N-DEx, RISS, and fusion centers 
is essential to improving information sharing. 
Administrators must also consider budget requests to provide the ability to share 
information mutually and be prepared to explain to political bodies why this funding is 
necessary. This funding may include payment to vendors to build interfaces to overcome 
proprietary issues and purchase equipment or software to connect to other systems. The 
chief executive must educate the political jurisdiction on the benefits and the risks of 
contributing information to the greater homeland security enterprise, both locally and 
nationally. 
D. PROMISING MODELS 
Although Texas agencies were the primary research area for this thesis, the author 
also spoke with the Ogden Police Department in Utah, as discussed in Chapter III. The 
Ogden Police Department provided valuable insight on the advantage of collaboration with 
nearby agencies. The department considers the ability to directly share information with 
these agencies a tangible benefit because many of the criminals they deal with in Ogden 
easily cross into other nearby jurisdictions. This example provides evidence that the 
concept of connected information systems is valuable to law enforcement officers in 
bordering geographic areas. Additional research is needed to determine if there is a 







Another promising sharing model is the data warehouse examples in Colorado. The 
Colorado Information Sharing Consortium (CISC) serves nearly 80 law enforcement 
agencies contributing and retrieving data from the warehouse.79 The CISC model 
combines the elements of information sharing with access to an analyst team. With portals 
to N-DEx and LInX, the CISC provides subscriber agencies a valuable information 
resource, not unlike a fusion center. State governments or regional collaborations of 
government agencies should consider the feasibility of sponsoring such a model. Regional 
consortiums could work in conjunction with fusion centers to provide vast arrays of 
collaborative networks. 
N-DEx provides a data exchange model that is robust enough to support a 
nationwide network. Next to fusion centers, N-DEx was the most widely recognized 
resource for data in this study. N-DEx provides immediate access to a wide variety of 
records, including incident reports, probation and parole reports, booking reports, traffic 
citations, mug shots, and even images of arrestees’ scars, marks, or tattoos.80 It is hard to 
understate the value of such a vast resource of potential information. One key to improving 
N-DEx is for agencies to understand the value of contributing their data and not just being 
passive subscribers.  
E. ANSWERING THE QUESTION 
This thesis asked the question: How can law enforcement agencies directly share 
information more effectively and efficiently to identify criminal suspects, organized crime, 
or potential terrorist activities? The answer has several possible solutions and could depend 
on agency size, location, and mission. Law enforcement agencies in the United States 
tasked with providing general protective and investigative services to a defined geographic 
jurisdiction can use these recommendations as a starting point for improvement.  
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1. Regional Agency Combined RMS 
Although using a singular RMS solution requires considerable political cooperation 
and agency coordination, a combined system can reduce wasted duplication of resources 
in bordering or overlapping jurisdiction areas. A multi-agency CAD and RMS is a viable 
option, especially when agencies plan well in advance and agree in writing to issues of 
ownership, cost bearing, and maintenance. Smaller agencies may find more significant 
benefit in signing on as subscribers to a larger agency’s system. The complexities and risks 
of procurement can be delegated to the host agency, while the smaller agency benefits from 
a robust product and information access to the other organization’s data. 
An alternative to a single combined RMS is for agencies near each other to consider 
using the same RMS vendor. Some vendors provide information sharing between different 
agencies using their product, as seen in the Ogden example. If agencies are wary of not 
retaining ownership of the RMS, the alternative of using the same vendor as their nearby 
partners can provide an agency-specific solution that still allows investigators to research 
relevant data in their region quickly. 
2. Governmental Sponsorship and Funding 
Both the Chicago and Colorado models provide excellent examples of data 
warehouses that connect dozens of law enforcement organizations. Regional councils of 
government or state-level law enforcement organizations are excellent candidates to 
sponsor information-sharing initiatives. Participation may require agencies to contribute 
funds as a subscriber. Alternatively, governmental bodies could allocate funding to support 
data warehouse initiatives.  
CRIMES is a useful model as a research-based, government-subsidized system. 
The operation cost is lower per agency, and the research benefits are helpful to the overall 
criminal justice system. A system like this deserves better funding, specifically if it 
provides a valuable resource for smaller agencies, as CRIMES seems to do. If the 







Funding is a critical component of improvement in information sharing. Smaller 
agencies may need help with funding the appropriate hardware or software additions 
needed to share data with exchanges directly. Some agencies may need help in paying for 
a proper, basic RMS. Grant opportunities should exist to spur innovation of information 
sharing between law enforcement, especially at the regional or state level.  
3. Raising Awareness of Information Resources 
This research supports improvements in the marketing and training on the value of 
fusion centers, RISS, and N-DEX. There are also tools on the open market that law 
enforcement agencies should use to improve their investigative capabilities, although there 
is a cost involved for these products. The responsibility for training lies primarily with law 
enforcement leaders. Agency executives should purposefully research the full breadth of 
information gathering tools, then educate their staff on the options. Leaders must also 
educate their constituents and their politicians, working to garner support for information 
resources that will make the community safer. 
Government-sponsored resources should ensure that all potential users and their 
agencies are shown their products’ value. The mere existence and passive subscribership 
of these tools are not good enough. Instead, the taxpayer funds dedicated to supporting 
programs like RISS or fusion centers demand widespread and consistent usage by small 
and large organizations. Fusion centers provide valuable products, and increasing the 
marketing of these products is likely to increase their usage and, in turn, their effectiveness. 
4. Mandatory Participation in Data Exchanges 
Data exchanges such as LInX or N-DEx can connect agencies nationwide; 
however, they are only as useful as the information they receive. Participation in 
contributing information to data exchanges should be encouraged, incentivized, or even 
mandated. Best practices or accreditation programs should require it. The federal or state 
government could have a role in this by allocating funding to help agencies purchase the 
needed technology to contribute data. The requirement to participate in data exchanges 
could later be tied to eligibility for other funding types, for example, grant funding for law 






Full participation in a data exchange may be one of the best solutions to the 
information-sharing problem. This option allows agencies to retain ownership of their data 
while still contributing critical information to the greater homeland security enterprise. In 
turn, investigators and analysts can access a vast resource of information across municipal 
and state boundaries. The data exchange model reduces many of the political and technical 
barriers to sharing RMS. Implementing this solution is not without cost and will require a 
great deal of marketing, education, and motivation to be fully effective. 
F. THE RIGHT COMBINATION 
No single solution will fix the lack of information sharing in the homeland security 
enterprise. Law enforcement agencies collect a great deal of data that holds the potential to 
improve our country’s safety and security. The key is sharing, in particular outwardly. 
Although local law enforcement in the United States is traditionally and sometimes 
stubbornly independent, agencies cannot remain silos of information. Instead, those in the 
profession must come to understand the value of a controlled yet robust sharing program. 
Front line workers need access to the information contained in both neighboring and distant 
law enforcement information systems to more effectively protect our nation from criminal 
or terrorist threats. 
Whether sharing a multi-agency RMS, participating in data exchanges, or an 
amalgamation thereof, law enforcement executives must find the right combination of 
solutions. These solutions should protect the data and the organization’s integrity while 
still providing external agencies the resources needed to connect criminal and intelligence 
information. A successful result will be a robust network that puts the United States on the 
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